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          Most naval fortresses were retired from service after the end of the Second World War, but 
new defence technologies and geostrategic environments may indeed revive the fortress concept, 
and turn it into a new option for a sea denial strategy, especially for relatively small or weak 
countries. This paper will firstly review the reasons why fortresses went out of style, secondly 
explore the present environmental and technological factors for reconsidering their use, thirdly 
elaborate on the limitations of modern naval fortresses, and finally discuss how fortresses fit the 
geostrategic environment of the Twenty First Century. 
 
The Changing Conditions of Naval Fortresses  
          It can be observed that fortresses indeed have better protection and firepower compared to 
vessels, as weight and space do not impinge on such issues. In several historical cases, such as the 
1904 Siege of Port Author during the Russo-Japanese War, the strategic and tactical values of naval 
fortresses were demonstrated. However, after the Second World War, their universal retirement 
made it clear that the heavy protection of naval fortresses was inadequate for new operational and 
tactical considerations, due to nuclear weapons, anti-ship missiles and mobile warfare. Furthermore, 
the bipolar and then subsequent unipolar maritime balance of power also contributes to the 
infeasibility of fixed coastal defence.     
          However, such factors operating during the Cold War era have altered in this century and 
may endow naval fortresses with new significance. Firstly, the non-proliferation mechanisms and 
reduced levels of confrontation between nuclear powers, in addition to the fact that many potential 
hot spots concern issues between nuclear and non-nuclear countries, all make for a reduced 
potential in nuclear engagement, and allow the focus of warfare to be shifted back to conventional 
arms. In terms of conventional arms, naval fortresses would be more likely to survive, except for a 
few types of “bunker busters.” Secondly, despite the US Navy’s current superiority over other 
counterparts, several rising naval powers, particularly China, are potentially just as likely or even 
more likely to get involved in naval conflicts. The gradual development in Washington of 
increasingly passive attitudes toward using force overseas provides newer naval powers with room 
to exert their influence. Compared to the US Navy, the new navies have a weaker ability to project 
their firepower due to their lower capabilities in naval aviation. Bunker busters place a heavy 
burden on such limited aviation capability, with the result that it may prove difficult to use air 
power with conventional arms to neutralise a naval fortress.  
          Finally, naval fortresses present a form of a countermeasure for coastal countries challenged 
by new rising naval powers. Without the weight and space restrictions of vessels, most long-range 
weapon systems can be freely to be adopted for use in naval fortresses to cover significant areas of 
sea territory. A modern naval fortress with missiles and other arms could be able to deny hostile 
naval activity in territorial waters and exclusive economic zones (EEZ) up to 200 nautical miles 
from baselines. Moreover, the lack of constraints on space and power would facilitate easy future 
upgrades with new weapon systems, such as electromagnetic guns or lasers. As for defence and 
protection, this can be divided into active and passive aspects. For active defence, modern naval 
weapon systems can be designed to form several layers of air defence, thus minimising air strike by 
an adversary, in the form of both aircraft and missiles. In respect of passive protection, fortress 
design’s freedom from weight limitation means that concrete and metal materials can be sufficiently 
used, as well as hollow layered and reactive armour, thus further reducing the effects of explosive 
and armour piercing warheads. The lack of threat from sinking or underwater attack clearly endows 
fortresses with better survivability compared to vessels. Furthermore, decision makers would not 
need to have concerns about national reputations or “losing face” as when capital ships are lost in 
battle. In other words, naval fortresses may present a more robust alternative compared to major 
surface ships or submarines, or at least provide a useful supplement to fleets.  
 
Limitations on Fortresses 
          The obvious defect of fortresses is their lack of mobility. They are also unable to provide 
diplomatic functions, such as venues for friendly visits, and other peacetime missions, such as law 
enforcement at sea. Furthermore, despite equipping them with long range weapon systems, naval 
fortresses can only cover a tiny section of the high seas and are unlikely to support remote locations. 
For a country with large territorial waters, such as Indonesia, a few fortresses would not provide 
comprehensive defence. Finally, new defence technology such as major improvements in projectiles 
may also threaten naval fortresses.  
 
In summary, naval fortresses could provide in this century a potentially significant alternative to 
existing means of sea denial, and would be more likely to be used as an adjunct to existing assets.   
 
            
